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Abstract 
This paper analyses the joint behaviour of hourly wages and standard hours in the Netherlands. 
With respect to the development of full-time hours to different hypotheses are suggested: work-
sharing or productivity-sharing. Under the work-sharing hypothesis, high unemployment would 
lead to reduced hours, whereas under productivity-sharing, increased productivity leads to 
higher wages or reduced hours. The evidence is in favour of the productivity hypothesis. There 
is no direct impact of unemployment on the evolution of hours. Moreover, although reduced 
hours tend to increase hourly wages in the short run, this is not the case in the long run. 
 
JEL classification J22, J31 
Keywords Work-sharing, hours worked, productivity, wages 
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Hourly wages and working time in the Dutch market sector 1962-1995 
 
1. Introduction 
During the 20th century there has been an impressive decline in annual working hours in 
capitalist countries. Nowadays full-time workers tend to work about 800 to 1000 hours less a 
year than their grandparents a few generations earlier. In some countries the bulk of the decline 
occurred during the first-half of the last century, in other countries the decline started later. In 
1936, under Blum’s Front Populaire, France was the first country to introduce the 40-hour 
week, for example. The New Deal policy of the 1930s in the United States also involved a 
reduction of working hours. These are two early examples of a so-called work-sharing strategy, 
i.e. redistributing work amongst people so as to reduce involuntary unemployment, Drèze 
(1986, p. 562). 
After the Second World War during the period of reconstruction, working hours remained 
rather high in many European countries, whereas the 40-hour week was introduced in the USA. 
During the high growth period of the 1960s and early 1970s, however, working times were 
substantially reduced in (continental) European countries. So before the oil shocks of the 1970s, 
standard working times were fairly harmonised in Western industrialised countries, just as in the 
beginning of the century. The large reductions of working time during this post-war period, are 
probably examples of the process of allocating the gains of productivity growth between wage 
increases and increases in leisure time. I will call this phenomenon productivity-sharing, as 
opposed to the work-sharing argument presented above. 
Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, full-time hours remained rather stable in the USA and 
the UK, but they dropped further in continental Europe. An important question is whether this 
decline was due to work-sharing or to productivity-sharing. In other words, was it a defensive 
strategy intended to reduce unemployment or was it just consuming part of the productivity 
gains in increased leisure. 
The paper provides an answer for the Dutch market sector, where work-sharing was hotly 
debated between social partners, especially during the 1980s. To analyse the problem, a simple 
model of joint wage and hours determination is introduced. The model allows the identification 
of separate channels for productivity-sharing and work-sharing. To deal with the non-
stationarity of the data, cointegration techniques are used, and the model is estimated in error-
correction form. The evidence suggests that the full 600 hours reduction of full-time hours 
between 1960 and 1995 was the result of productivity-sharing, not of work-sharing.  
Moreover, the results indicate that reduced hours did not increase hourly wage costs, at 
least in the long run. The typical Dutch wage equation is specified in annual terms, however, 
without a separate effect for hours worked, see Broer et al. (2000), Broersma and Den Butter 
(2002), Graafland and Huizinga (1999) or Muysken et al. (1999). That specification is rejected 
in my analysis: annual hours do have a separate role to play in wage equations. 
The impact of reduced hours on wages has also been stressed in the work-sharing 
literature, see e.g. Hunt (1998) and Kapteyn et al. (2004) for recent overviews. The theoretical 
effect is ambiguous, but the empirical evidence seems to point in the direction of reduced hours 
increasing hourly wages, see Kapteyn et al. (2004). The analysis presented here suggests that 
although this effect occurs in the short run, it may disappear in the longer run.  
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Only few papers include the determinants of standard hours worked in an empirical 
analysis.1 Exceptions are Jacobson and Ohlsson (2000) and Kapteyn et al. (2004), who estimate 
joint models of wages, hours and employment. Both papers report a small negative wage 
elasticity in their wage equation, suggesting that income effects of labour supply dominate. The 
evidence presented here indicates that beside labour supply factors, labour demand factors play 
a role in the determination of standard hours.  
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides some background for the Dutch market 
sector since 1960. Section 3 introduces some of the theoretical aspects of the work-sharing 
versus productivity-sharing debate, using a simple log-linear model for the behaviour of wages 
and working hours. Section 4 presents some properties of the data, showing that cointegrating 
relations exist. Section 5 provides the estimation results. The implications for the work-sharing 
or productivity-sharing debate are summarised in Section 6. Conclusions are drawn in the final 
section. 
 
2. Dutch working time developments2 
Figure 1 shows the development of normal full-time working hours in the Dutch market sector. 
The solid line corresponds to annual hours, whereas the dotted line represents weekly hours. 
The data do not incorporate overtime hours, neither do they correct for absenteeism. The 
empirical evidence suggests that actual hours follow standard hours quite closely, see Hunt 
(1999), Ilmakunnas (1995) and Kapteyn et al. (2004). During the fifties, annual working time 
(H) decreased rather slowly from about 2350 hours to roughly 2300 hours. At that time a normal 
workweek consisted of 48 hours and employees had two to three weeks off per year, including 
public holidays. During the sixties and early seventies, weekly hours decreased gradually to 
reach the 40-hour week in 1975. At the same time some additional holidays were introduced, so 
that in the beginning of the seventies four weeks off became the norm. As a consequence of 
both developments, annual working time fell below 1900 hours in 1975. The average decrease 
in normal hours during this period until the oil shocks amounted to 1.2% per annum, see Table 
1, which presents some key indicators by sub-period. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The whole period of the sixties and the first half of the seventies was characterised by low 
unemployment rates and strong productivity growth. Before the first oil crisis, the 
unemployment rate (u) was on average over the period 1960-1973 only 1.1%, and hourly 
productivity (Ah) increased by 6.2% per year. The net hourly real consumer wage (Wn) lagged 
slightly behind with a growth rate of 5.0%, whereas gross hourly real producer wages (Wc) 
                                                     
1 Sometimes a distinction is made between actual and standard hours. However, the empirical evidence 
surveyed in Kapteyn et al. (2004) suggests that actual working hours move (almost) proportionally with 
standard hours. 
2 For more extensive descriptions of the recent history of the Dutch labour market, see e.g. Broersma et 
al. (2000) or Hartog (1999). An account of the development of Dutch working time is given in De 
Neubourg (1991) and Van Doorne-Huiskes and De Lange (1994). 
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increased by 7.5%. The difference was mainly caused by the increasing tax wedge to finance the 
welfare state arrangements introduced during the sixties. As a consequence, the labour share in 
value added (ϕN) increased substantially from 62% in 1960 to 82% in 1975. 
After the first oil shock in 1974, the Dutch economy was in disarray. Unemployment 
increased rapidly, reaching its highest level of about 10% in 1983. Simultaneously, the growth 
rate of hourly productivity dropped to only 3.2% in the period 1974-1982. Wage increases 
where roughly in line with productivity, but the labour share remained at a high level. The 
decrease in working time slowed down: 40-hours a week remained the norm, although the 
number of holidays increased slightly, reducing the number of weeks worked. In 1982 the 
labour market situation was considered to be dramatic, this lead to consultations between the 
government and the social partners. In October 1982 the famous Wassenaar Agreement was 
struck. One of the main recommendations was to moderate wage claims in exchange for 
increases in employment and reductions in working time. 
With respect to wages, the impact of the Wassenaar Agreement can be seen from Table 1. 
Real hourly wages increased less than hourly productivity: whereas hourly productivity 
increased with 2.2% per year in the period 1983-1995, real hourly wage costs increased only by 
1.3%. As a consequence, the labour share fell with 10 percentage points. In terms of 
unemployment the results were less impressive, as unemployment remained rather high. 
However, the small decrease in 1995, has been followed by larger decreases during the second 
half of the 1990s. 
After the Wassenaar Agreement, annual standard full-time working time fell from 1840 
hours in 1982 to 1740 hours in 1992, see Figure 1. This decrease is partly due to a reduction of 
the normal workweek to 38.5 hours in the eighties. The second element is a further increase in 
the number of days off, amounting to almost seven weeks in 1995. 
In summary, on average annual full-time working hours declined with 0.8% per year in 
the period 1960-1995. Part of this decline occurred during the golden sixties, but another part 
during the high unemployment era of the eighties. This suggests that both the productivity-
sharing – consuming productivity gains in leisure – and the work-sharing arguments – reducing 
hours in an attempt to redistribute unemployment – could be relevant. 
As a first crude test, Table 2 presents Granger causality tests between working time H, 
hourly productivity Ah and unemployment u.3 The results indicate that working time is Granger 
caused by productivity, but not by unemployment. Moreover, productivity and unemployment 
do not seem to be Granger caused by full-time working hours.4 These results suggest that the 
decline in full-time working hours is most likely due to the productivity-sharing hypothesis. To 
analyse the underlying mechanisms in some more detail, however, the next sections develop and 
estimate a simple model. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                     
3 Except for the unemployment rate u, small letters denote natural logarithms of the corresponding 
variables. 
4 Similar results were obtained from a reduced form specification, omitting the contemporaneous 
exogenous variables as explanatory variables under the general specification. 
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3. Theoretical background 
From a theoretical point of view, the work-sharing strategy has been severely criticised. The 
major argument is the so-called lump-of-labour fallacy, see Layard et al. (1991, Ch. 10) and 
Kapteyn et al. (2004). This critique refutes the idea that there is a fixed amount of work that can 
be redistributed at will. On the contrary, employment  and thus unemployment  is determined by 
demand and supply factors, or in a more modern context by price and wage setting behaviour. 
Reductions in working time, may affect both price setting and wage setting, and the final impact 
on (un)employment is uncertain, see Freeman (1998), Hunt (1998), Kapteyn et al. (2004) and 
Marimon and Zilibotti (2000). 
The contribution of this paper is to have a closer look into the origin of the observed 
reduced hours. The impact on unemployment will not be investigated.5 Two alternative 
hypotheses are typically suggested: the work-sharing hypothesis and what I labelled the 
productivity-sharing hypothesis. According to the work-sharing hypothesis reductions in hours 
may be due to high unemployment; whereas the productivity-sharing hypothesis indicates that 
productivity growth is the driving force. In the latter case, there may be a trade-off in wage 
determination between increased hourly remuneration and reductions in hours worked. The 
simplest model to capture both elements is a joint model of wage and hours determination. 
 
3.1 Wage determination 
In modern wage theories, wages are set, in one way or another, as a mark-up on the outside 
option, see Layard et al. (1991) for a well-known illustration. In the general equilibrium this 
leads to a wage curve, where wages depend negatively on the unemployment rate u. This curve 
may shift upward if aspiration levels, such as benefits or productivity, increase. Considering a 
simple log-linear specification, where except for the unemployment rate u lowercase letters 
denote natural log’s, this may be summarised for our purposes as 
 
0c h a h b u s x ww h a b u s xγ γ γ γ γ γ γ ′= − + + − + +     (1) 
 
where wc is the real hourly wage cost, h is annual full-time hours worked, ah is hourly 
productivity, b is net real level of unemployment benefits, u is the unemployment rate, s is the 
wedge between real producer wage costs wc and real net hourly consumer wages wn, and finally 
xw summarises other wage push variables. In general the γ-parameters are expected to be 
positive. 
As it stands, equation (1) includes the main determinants of Dutch wage equations, see 
for example Broer et al. (2000), Broersma and Den Butter (2002), Graafland and Huisinga 
(1999) and Muysken et al. (1999). First, capturing the aspiration level of workers, wages 
increase with productivity and with benefit levels. Typically, it is found that the effect is 
                                                     
5 To do so, the model should be augmented with a labour demand or price setting equation. This is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Jacobson and Ohlsson (2000) and Kapteyn et al. (2004) include an 
employment equation in their analysis. 
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proportionally, implying γa = 1 − γb. Second, as predicted in theory, higher unemployment 
reduces wages. Third, tax shifting is an important phenomenon in the Netherlands.6  
Calmfors (1985) discusses the impact of working hours in a union monopoly framework. 
The impact of hours worked on hourly wages is indeterminate, with different factors operating 
in opposite directions. The impact is most likely to be U-shaped: for short hours reduced 
working times are likely to increase hourly wages; whereas for longer hours the opposite may 
be true. The sign conjectured in equation (1) illustrates the belief that the first case is nowadays 
most likely to occur. Moreover, as total remuneration is most likely to fall, γh < 1 can be 
expected to hold. 
Unfortunately, most empirical aggregate wage studies formulate their models in terms of 
annual wages (wc + h) and annual productivity (a = ah + h). The Dutch wage studies mentioned 
earlier are examples. This specification is just a special case of equation (1), with γh = 1 − γa. 
The only exception for the Netherlands I am aware of is Dur (2001). He finds an estimate of 
0.77 for γh indicating that a reduction in hours worked leads to an increase in hourly wages, 
although significantly less than proportional. However, as his wage equation contains the capital 
stock instead of labour productivity as an explanatory variable, it is hard to interpret this result. 
In their cross-country panel study Kapteyn et al. (2004) find a value of 0.40 for γh, with a 
standard error of 0.13, suggesting that hourly wages increase, although less than proportionally. 
However, their productivity variable is GNP per capita (with an elasticity of 0.47). Rewriting 
this in terms of GNP per hour worked, as in equation (1), the implied coefficient for γh is only 
−0.07, suggesting an insignificant decrease in hourly wages. 
 
3.2 Hours determination 
Turning to the determinants of hours worked, the bulk of the literature focuses on labour supply 
models. Using a log-linear specification this would yield something like 
 
0
s
w n x sh w xα α α ′= − +        (2) 
 
where hs is labour supply and wn (≡ wc − s) is the net real consumer wage. The vector xs captures 
other factors that may affect the individual labour supply decision, such as non-wage incomes, 
social norms, etc. To explain the downward trend in hours worked, these type of models have to 
assume that income effect dominates so that the labour supply curve is backward bending, 
implying αw > 0 in equation (2). A problem with this approach is that most (cross-section) 
estimates of labour supply elasticities find small but non-negative wage elasticities, indicating 
αw < 0. This is inconsistent with the observed secular decline in hours, unless the decline in 
hours is explained by factors in xs.  
The alternative explanation is that workers are constrained in their choice of working 
hours, as found for example by Dickens and Lundberg (1993), Osberg and Phipps (1993) and 
Tummers and Woittiez (1991). Union bargaining models including hours can explain this 
                                                     
6 It sometimes is suggested that there is a difference between employer contributions and employee taxes, 
see Muysken et al. (1999). This difference is ignored in the present paper. 
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phenomenon. The two extreme alternatives are on the one hand hours set by monopoly unions 
and on the other hand hours set by firms.  
To start with the monopoly union case, Calmfors (1985) has shown that unions tend to 
demand working times (hm) that are shorter than considered optimal from the viewpoint of 
individuals (hs). The idea is that unions take into account the impact of hours worked on the 
demand for labour (i.e. the number of workers). Unions thus have an incentive to cut down 
hours to reduce the probability of unemployment. As the loss is lower if the outside option for 
union members is higher, union hours hm will increase with the benefit level and decrease with 
unemployment. The latter effect corresponds to the work-sharing hypothesis. Generalising the 
labour supply equation (2), union hours can be written as 
 
0
m
w n b u x mh w b u xα α α α α ′= − + − +      (3) 
 
Unfortunately, the wage elasticity of union hours can not be signed a priori, although it can be 
argued that union hours are more likely to fall with net real wages than individual labour supply. 
The vector xm consists of the labour supply factors xs, but also of factors related to the labour 
demand elasticity of the firm. As long as the labour demand elasticity is not affected by 
productivity increases, there is no direct role for the hourly productivity variable ah, however. 
Nevertheless, equation (3) already incorporates elements of productivity-sharing hypothesis, but 
in the same indirect way as for the labour supply model: a permanent productivity shock affects 
the wages determined in equation (1), which in turn influence union hours. Accordingly, αw > 0 
is consistent with the productivity-sharing hypothesis.  
A rather different approach would be to assume that firms unilaterally determine working 
hours. In labour demand models distinguishing between workers and hours, there is a trade-off 
between the extensive margin – the number of workers – and the intensive margin – the number 
of hours worked per worker. As long as fixed costs per worker exist, an increase in hourly wage 
costs leads to a relative cost increase for the intensive margin, reducing optimal demand for 
hours hd, see e.g. Hart (1984). In a log-linear specification, this leads to the following simple 
demand for hours 
 
0
d
w c x dh w xα α α ′= − +        (4) 
 
The demand for hours depends negatively on wage costs wc, and not on net real wages wn as in 
the labour supply model (2) or the monopoly union hours equation (3). The vector xd captures 
other factors that may influence the demand for hours, such as factor prices like the user costs of 
capital, and non-neutral technical progress. 
Finally, a bargaining model of hours would combine the determinants included in the 
monopoly union model (3) and the labour demand model (4). This yields the generic log-linear 
model 
 
0 w c b u s xh w b u s xα α α α α α ′= − + − + +      (5) 
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By an appropriate choice of the α-parameters and forcing variables in x, this equation 
encompasses all three previous models. Due to data limitations the forcing variables will be 
ignored in the empirical application. The monopoly union model (3) then leads to the 
restrictions αs = αw, as net wages determine hours in that case. Further omitting the outside 
option αb = αu = 0 would yield the labour supply model (2). On the other hand, the joint 
restrictions αb = αu = αs = 0 give the labour demand model of equation (4). Kapteyn et al. 
(2004) include the hourly before tax earnings and the employment rate in their cross-country 
study. This is another mixture of the above models. Their corresponding estimates are αw = 0.11 
and αu = −0.01. 
 
3.3 Reduced form 
Equations (1) and (5) jointly determine hourly wages and working time, at given productivity, 
benefit levels, unemployment and wedge. To focus on the work-sharing versus productivity-
sharing hypotheses, consider the following reduced form elasticities of working time with 
respect to productivity and unemployment 
 
0
1
w a
w hh
dh
da
α γ
α γ− <−=         (6) 
1
u w u
w h
dh
du
α α γ
α γ
−− −=        (7) 
 
where αw γh < 1 is assumed to hold. This assumption implies that the downward sloping (in 
terms of hours) wage equation is flatter than the backward bending hours equation. This is 
obviously the case when hours would be inelastic with respect to wages. 
An increase in hourly productivity directly affects wage setting (1), but does not directly 
influence working time in (5). Given the expected signs of the parameters, αw > 0 and γh > 0, the 
induced increase in wages reduces hours worked, which in turn may lead to an additional 
pressure on hourly wages. As a result, hourly wages increase more than the initial impact γa and 
working hours decline more. So the model supports the productivity-sharing hypothesis that 
increased productivity leads to reductions in working time. 
An increase in unemployment has a direct impact both on wage setting and hours 
determination: wages are moderated (γu > 0) and hours worked are reduced due to the work-
sharing motive (αu > 0). The indirect effects, however, work exactly in the opposite directions. 
The wage moderation leads to an upward pressure on hours worked (if αw > 0), whereas the 
initial reduction in hours through the work-sharing motive leads to an upward pressure on 
hourly wages (if γh > 0). The final impact is ambiguous for both hours and hourly wages. 
Whether the work-sharing hypothesis holds is thus an empirical matter. 
 
4. Data and estimation procedure 
The model was estimated with annual data for 1960-1997 for the Dutch market sector. The last 
two years have been retained to test for predictive failure. The sources are briefly described in 
the Data Appendix. The development of the main variables has been outlined in Section 2. 
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Table 3 gives time series properties of the data. All but one series appear to have unit roots.7 
Most series are I(1), although real wage costs wc seem to be I(2).8 Given the low power of unit 
root tests in small samples, however, the impression is that this is due to the rather short sample 
period. Moreover, net real wages wn and the wedge s are both I(1), which would imply that their 
sum (wc) should also be I(1). Similarly, the labour share ϕN and labour productivity per hours 
worked ah are I(1), so their sum – again corresponding to wc – should be I(1). Taken together, it 
thus seems reasonable to proceed as if real wage costs are I(1). 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
An alternative to the hypothesis of non-stationarity of our series could be that the series 
are stationary, but with structural breaks. The obvious candidates for such breaks could be the 
oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s or the Wassenaar Agreement of 1982. Experimenting with 
such breaks did not change the conclusion, however, that the variables appear to be non-
stationary. 
To account for the non-stationarity of the data, the model was estimated in error-
correction form. This has the additional advantage of allowing flexible dynamics in the process 
of wage formation and hours determination, as the theories presented in the previous section 
have nothing to say about the dynamic adjustment path. 
Before analysing the structural error correction model for wages and working time, I 
applied Johansen’s procedure to test for the number of cointegrating relations in the system of 
six variables. A VAR of order 2 with constant and trend was specified.9 In order to exclude the 
possibility of a quadratic trend under the hypothesis of one or more unit roots, the linear trend 
was restricted to appear only in the cointegrating relations. Table 4 reports the two usual 
likelihood ratio statistics for cointegration, see Johansen and Juselius (1990).10 Neither test 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of three cointegrating relationships, whereas the null 
hypothesis of at most two relations is rejected: at a 1% significance level for the trace statistic 
and at 5% significance for the maxλ  statistic. Accordingly there appear to be three cointegrating 
relations within the system of six variables. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                     
7 The only series that seems to be stationary is the difference between the replacement rate ρ and the 
labour share ϕN. As both series individually are I(1), this suggests that both variables are cointegrated. 
The economic logic might be that higher benefits lead to higher taxes, leading in turn to an increase in the 
labour share, but this is speculative. Alternatively, a high labour share might increase the demands for 
relatively high benefits. 
8 There is some evidence in the literature that nominal wages and prices could be I(2), but relative prices, 
and thus real wages, are typically found to be I(1), see e.g. Banerjee et al. (2001). 
9 With annual data two lag’s appear to be reasonable, but because of a lack of degrees of freedom I did 
not test for the number of significant lag’s. But, as the unrestricted reduced form of the conditional model 
does not seem to be misspecified, see Table 5 in the next section, the number of lags included appear to 
be appropriate. 
10 The results were obtained using PcFiml 9.0, see Doornik and Hendry (1997). 
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Since the main interest lies in modelling wages and working time – rather than in deriving 
empirical models for productivity, benefits, unemployment or the wedge – a conditional 
approach seems appropriate.11 Such an approach only yields valid inferences if the conditioning 
variables are weakly exogenous for the short-run and long-run parameters of the wage and 
working time model. This will be tested for. 
Within the conditional model a maximum of two cointegrating relations can be identified, 
which will be identified as wage setting and hours determination, respectively. As there are 
three cointegrating relations within the system, no unique long-run relations can be found, 
however. Table 3 suggests that the third cointegrating relation may be that between the 
replacement rate and the labour share, as their difference is stationary. This involves five of the 
six variables of the system, with only the unemployment rate not included. This third relation 
could be used to eliminate the benefit level from the long-run cointegrating relations. 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
5.1 Unrestricted reduced form 
As argued by Spanos (1990), the statistical adequacy of a structural model should be assessed 
by misspecification tests of the unrestricted reduced form (URF). The URF is the unrestricted 
model of wc and h, conditional upon ah, b, u and s. As with the VAR of the system, the maximal 
lag length was a priori set to 2. A constant and a trend were also included. The trend may 
capture the omitted exogenous variables in the model, especially in the hours equation. It is 
highly significant in the URF-model, with a p-value of 0.006. Including other explanatory 
variables failed to get rid of the trend. In particular, the share of female employment, the 
incidence of part-time employment and a crude measure for quasi-fixed labour costs were used. 
The first two variables were intended to capture changes in preferences, the latter variable 
should influence the demand for hours. Neither variable had a significant effect. 
Table 5 provides some statistics for the two reduced form equations. There is clear 
evidence of first-order auto-correlation in the wage equation. However, transforming the 
dependent variable from hourly wages wc to annual wages wc+h (see the third column of the 
table), seems to solve this problem. This suggests that the auto-correlation problem is an artefact 
of the contemporaneous interaction between wage setting and hours determination, which will 
be taken into account in the structural model.12 So no further lags were needed to avoid auto-
correlation. None of the other diagnostic tests indicate misspecification at the 5% significance 
level. 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 See Urbain (1995) for a discussion of the relative merits and pitfalls of modelling cointegrated systems 
in conditional or in full system models. 
12 Moreover, the negative correlation ρˆ between the residuals of the two equations of the model almost 
vanishes when wc is replaced by wc+h. 
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The table also includes the Lagrange-multiplier test suggested by Boswijk and Urbain 
(1997) for weak exogeneity of the regressors for the long-run parameters (LMC). It tests the 
significance of the lagged error-correction errors of the URF in the marginal model of the 
conditioning variables and is not significant.13 Accordingly, the conditional approach can be 
used to provide valid inference on the long-run parameters. 
 
5.2 Identification 
The next step in the analysis is the specification of a just-identified structural model (JID). As 
illustrated by Johansen and Juselius (1994), this includes identification of the long-run and the 
short-run structure. To start with the latter, Table 5 indicates that the contemporaneous 
interaction between hourly wage setting and hours determination may be an important issue. 
There are several possibilities: at one extreme, wages may be set with predetermined working 
hours, which would imply that current hours ht influence current wages wct, but not vice versa; 
at the other extreme, current hours are set with predetermined hourly wages in labour supply 
models, which would imply that current net real wages wnt influence hours ht, but not vice versa. 
Many intermediate positions are possible. The just-identified model allows for interactions in 
both directions, which requires other identifying restrictions for the dynamics. As there does not 
seem to be any theoretical reason to pick a particular (lagged) variable, the least significant 
lagged differenced variables in the URF was used. As a consequence, the lagged change in 
hours in the wage equation and the lagged change in unemployment in the hours equation were 
omitted for identification purposes. Using different short-run identification restrictions yielded 
the same parsimonious results. 
A diagonal error-correction matrix was used to identify the long-run parameters in the 
JID. This does not provide any structural interpretation, but allows for a simple test of no-
cointegration (WNC). This is a Wald-test for the joint occurrence of the lagged levels (the error-
correction terms) in each individual equation. Under the null-hypothesis of no-cointegration the 
distribution of the test is non-standard, but Boswijk (1994) has calculated critical values.14 
Table 6 gives the results for the JID-model, estimated by FIML. For notational economy, 
the table does not report the short-run dynamics, but only the cointegrating relations and the 
corresponding diagonal error-correction terms. The standard errors of the cointegrating vectors 
are calculated using the methods given in Bårdsen (1989). The no-cointegration tests give mixed 
results. For the hours equation, the WNC statistic is significant at the 1% level, rejecting the 
null-hypothesis of no-cointegration. This is confirmed by a Dickey-Fuller statistic (CDF) on the 
cointegrating vector. For the wage equation, however, the WNC is only significant at the 10% 
level. On the other hand, the CDF statistic suggests that the cointegrating vector is stationary.15 
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                     
13 The marginal system is modelled as an unrestricted VAR of the four conditioning variables with 2 lags, 
a constant and a trend. 
14 Boswijk (1994) calls WNC an instability test, but to avoid confusion I prefer to call it a no-
cointegration test. The *τξ -statistic was used to account for the trend in the model. With 4 exogenous 
variables, the 10%, 5% and 1% critical values are 20.76, 23.33 and 28.51, respectively. 
15 A more or less similar ambiguity of the no-cointegration test statistics can be found in the URF of 
Table 5. 
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The ambiguous results for the cointegration of the wage equation may be due to the 
inclusion of the trend in the equation. Single equation estimates of Dutch wage equations, see 
for example Broer et al. (2000), Broersma and Den Butter (2002) and Muysken et al. (1999), 
suggest that wages are indeed cointegrated with the variables included in here, but that no trend 
is needed. The parameter estimates of the cointegrating vector for wages in the JID even 
correspond fairly closely to the results found elsewhere: wages increase with productivity and 
benefits, their joint impact being proportional;16 wages decrease with unemployment, the semi-
elasticity being around –1; and tax shifting is rather strong. In view of this, the results of Tables 
6 and 7 are taken as evidence for the occurrence of two cointegrating relations in the constrained 
model. 
 
5.3 Parsimonious specification 
The next step was to identify structural long-run relations in the constrained model. In line with 
equations (1) and (5), the following parameterisation was used for the coingrating vectors:17 
 
0[ ]w c h a h b u sz w h a b u sγ γ γ γ γ γ= − − + + − +     (8) 
 
0[ ]h w c b u s tz h w b u s tα α α α α α= − − + − + +     (9) 
 
The first cointegrating vector zw is interpreted as wage setting, therefore the coefficient on 
wages is normalised to one and the identifying restriction is that the trend is excluded. The 
second cointegrating vector zh is interpreted as hours determination, accordingly the coefficient 
on hours is normalised to one and, in line with equation (5), the identifying restriction is that 
productivity is excluded. As a consequence, the error-correction matrix is no longer diagonal in 
the structural model. 
Table 7 presents the final estimation results of the structural model. It is a parsimonious 
specification that cannot be rejected against the URF, the p-value of the likelihood-ratio test for 
the 20 parameter restrictions being 0.238. The no-cointegration tests of the model indicate that 
there are indeed two different cointegrating vectors. Both series show deviations of the actual 
values relative to their long-run targets of at most 4% in absolute value, their correlation 
coefficient is 0.48. 
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
According to the cointegrating relation for wages zw, wage costs are proportional to the 
aspiration levels, given by a weighted average of productivity (64%) and benefits (the remaining 
                                                     
16 When the replacement rate instead of benefit level is included, as in Broer et al. (2000), wages are 
proportional to productivity. 
17 As the system of six variables contains three cointegrating relations, the two cointegrating relations of 
the constrained structural model are not uniquely identified. 
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36%).18 The long-run semi-elasticity of unemployment on wages is around –1 and the tax 
elasticity of wages is 0.6. Given the small standard error of the latter estimate, the tax burden is 
shared by both sides of the market in the long run. The impact of working time on hourly wages 
appears to be negative, although not significant (p-value 0.164). The results do reject that the 
long-run wage equation can be written in annual terms, the p-value of the restriction γh = 1 − γa 
being 0.035. Hence the usual Dutch wage equations seem to be misspecified. The results 
presented here indicate that in the long run reduced working time leads at most to a small 
increase in hourly wages, but certainly not sufficient to keep annual remuneration constant. So 
working time reduction unambiguously leads to wage moderation in terms of annual 
remuneration.19 
According to the cointegrating relation for hours zh, wages have a strong negative impact 
on normal hours, the elasticity being almost 1. However, as the wedge has only a much smaller 
positive impact, the long-run hours equation can not be written in terms of net wages only. The 
long-run hours equation thus combines supply and demand factors with roughly equal weights: 
the elasticity with respect to net wages being 0.44 and with respect to wage cost being –0.52 (= 
0.44–0.96). Real benefits have a strong positive impact of hours worked in the long run. This is 
consistent with the role of unions in hours determination, see equation (3). However, in that case 
hours determination should also incorporate the work-sharing argument. But no significant role 
is found for unemployment in the cointegrating relation for hours in Table 7, the p-value of the 
imposed restriction αu = 0 being 0.674.20 Finally, the cointegrating relation for hours includes a 
significant trend. In terms of a labour supply interpretation, this would essentially mean a shift 
of preferences towards longer hours. This seems rather unlikely, although one could argue that 
the increased opportunities of part-time work allowed the over-employed individuals to switch 
from full-time to part-time jobs. To test this hypothesis, the incidence of part-time employment 
and the share of female employment were included as explanatory variables, but without any 
success. An alternative interpretation of the trend comes from labour demand. A change in 
technology or a change in relative costs could also shift the demand for hours. A rough measure 
of quasi-fixed labour costs was included, but again without success. Further research in this 
direction is needed. 
The error-correction matrix is triangular in the structural model. The lagged cointegrating 
vector for wages zw has an expected negative impact on the growth of wages, but has a positive 
effect on the growth of working time. The error-correction of hours zh only affects the growth in 
working time negatively.21 The size of the own error-correction coefficients illustrates that 
wages adjust more quickly to disequilibrium than hours. This seems in accordance with the 
notion that bargaining over working time is not always on the agenda. Alternatively, it could be 
that social norms play an important role in the adjustment of hours worked, see e.g., Bentivogli 
(1992) and De Neubourg and Vendrik (1994). 
                                                     
18 The p-value of the likelihood-ratio test of the restriction that both coefficients in the cointegrating wage 
vector sum to one is 0.896. 
19 To test the possible U-shape between hourly wages and hours worked, lagged hours squared was added 
as an additional explanatory variable. This did not improve the fit, however. 
20 Moreover, when included in zh, unemployment has the wrong sign. 
21 The p-value for the imposed restriction that zht-1 does not affect the wage equation is 0.114. 
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The sign of zw in the hours equation is slightly puzzling, as it works in the opposite 
direction of the negative long-run impact of wages on hours. A possible explanation may be the 
intertemporal substitution hypothesis. When hourly wages temporarily exceed the long-run 
target, it may pay to increase hours temporarily above its own target level, even though the 
long-run elasticity of hours with respect to wages is negative. Combining the effects of both 
error-correction terms in the hours equation, lagged wages have a small negative impact on the 
growth of working time (–0.186 = 0.280–0.485*0.962). 
 
Finally, consider the dynamic adjustment of the parsimonious model. To derive valid inference 
for the short-run dynamics, weak-exogeneity requires the regressors and the disturbances to be 
orthogonal, see Boswijk and Urbain (1997). This is tested by adding the residuals of the 
marginal system of the conditioning variables to the structural model. This variable addition test 
(LMO) is not significant (p-value 0.161). Thus, the orthogonality restriction cannot be rejected 
and inference on short-run dynamics is valid. 
Wage growth is directly affected by the growth in productivity, benefits and the wedge. 
These estimates corresponded rather closely to the corresponding coefficients in the 
cointegrating vector for wages multiplied by the error-correction coefficient. Testing for this 
joint hypothesis gave a p-value of 0.804. Therefore, this restriction on the short-run dynamics of 
the wage equation in the parsimonious model was imposed in the specification of Table 7. 
Although the cointegrating wage relation is specified in hourly terms, the dependent 
variable in the dynamic equation is the annual wage growth. The restriction imposed on the 
coefficient for the growth in working time is accepted, with a p-value of 0.205.22 Notice, 
however, that the wage equation also includes the growth of annual productivity as an 
explanatory variable.23 Looking at the impact of a reduction in hours, this means that in the 
short-run annual remuneration is only reduced insofar as annual productivity is reduced. In other 
words, hourly wages tend to increase almost proportionally in the short run. The long-run 
effects discussed earlier showed, however, that in the long run hourly wages increase 
significantly less than proportional and may even remain constant. 
Changes in working hours are endogenous in the model, though, and adjustments in hours 
take a long time according to the estimates of the hours equation in Table 7. Again, this may be 
explained by social norms and habits. The negative sign of the lagged growth of hours, suggests 
that the adjustment path is oscillating, but to analyse the dynamic adjustment we should look at 
the whole system.24 The growth in working time reacts negatively to the contemporaneous 
increase in net real wages, although the impact is much smaller than in the long run.25 So, 
whereas in the long-run labour supply and demand factors jointly affect full-time hours, labour 
                                                     
22 The alternative hypothesis that the coefficient of 
t
h∆ equals 0, instead of –1, is strongly rejected, with a 
p-value of 0.0003 against a free estimate of that coefficient. 
23 Alternatively, the growth rate of hourly productivity could have been included, instead of the growth 
rate of annual productivity. This gives rather similar results, the log-likelihood being slightly higher 
(363.848). On the other hand, the correlation between the residuals of equations increases to 0.347 in this 
alternative specification.  
24 The characteristic roots of the parsimonious system are 0.682, –0.427, 0.271 and 0. The system is thus 
stable and oscillates. 
25 The p-value for the imposed restriction on ∆st is 0.654. Accordingly, the dynamic adjustment can 
indeed be specified in terms of the growth of net real wages. 
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supply effects appear to dominate in the short run. Finally, the innovation in real benefits 
increases the growth rate of hours. Unfortunately, it is hard to find any interpretation for this 
result. 
 
6. Work-sharing or productivity-sharing 
The estimation results can be used to consider the determinants of the Dutch full-time working 
time in more detail. Table 8 gives the implied long-run reduced form elasticities for wages and 
hours worked. For hours worked the table contains the empirical counterpart of the elasticities 
presented in equations (6) and (7).  
 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The wage elasticities with respect to the exogenous variables are roughly in line with the 
cointegrating relation zw identified in Table 7. The reason is that the estimated coefficient for 
hours γh in the wage equation (1) is rather small, so interaction effects via the hours equation (5) 
are almost negligible. The small negative decline of 0.2% a year is due to the trend in the hours 
equation, however. 
For full-time hours, the reduced form elasticities are a mixture of the effects identified in 
the hours and wage equations, often with opposite signs. Consistent with the productivity-
sharing hypothesis, there is a clear negative impact of productivity. This is due to the negative 
elasticity of working time with respect to wages, combined with the impact of productivity on 
wages. Partly offsetting this is the positive effect of the trend in the hours equation. An increase 
in benefits has a similar negative effect via the wage equation as an increase in productivity, but 
this indirect effect is dominated by the positive direct effect in hours determination. With 
respect to unemployment, no evidence for the work-sharing hypothesis was found in the 
structural model. Accordingly, there is only an indirect effect via the wage equation, leading to a 
positive instead of negative reduced form elasticity. As unemployment reduces wages, there is a 
upward pressure on hours. For the wedge, the direct and indirect effects work in opposite 
directions, and the indirect effect via wages appears to dominate. Finally, the positive effect of 
the trend is determined by its direct impact on hours. As the implied increase in hours reduces 
hourly wages in the wage equation, this feeds back to even longer hours in the hours equation. 
These estimated long-run reduced form elasticities reinforce the conclusion from the 
Granger causality tests in Table 2: the reduction in Dutch full-time hours should be entirely  
attributed to productivity-sharing, whereas work-sharing did not play any significant role. 
Combining the elasticities on hourly wages and hours worked, the third row of Table 8 
gives the impact on annual remuneration. The surprise may be that productivity and 
unemployment have rather weak effects, as the impact on wc and h roughly cancel out. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
The starting point for this paper was the observation that full-time working hours have steadily 
declined in the Netherlands. The two main hypotheses put forward for this behaviour are work-
sharing and productivity-sharing. In the former, one would expect hours to decline in times of 
high unemployment, whereas in the latter productivity induced wage growth is the transmission 
channel. The paper develops a simple empirical model to assess the importance of both 
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hypotheses. The joint model for wages and working time is estimated using cointegration 
techniques to account for the non-stationarity of the data. 
Two cointegrating relations were identified in the data, which can be interpreted as wage 
setting and the hours determination, respectively. The wage equation is quite consistent with 
earlier work on Dutch wage equations, the novelty being that wage models specified in annual 
terms seem to be misspecified. Indeed, full-time hours only appear to have a weak negative 
impact on hourly wages in the long run. So a reduction in working hours leads to a significant 
decline in total remuneration. 
The hours equation is not consistent with a simple labour supply model, but also seems to 
incorporate union (benefits) and labour demand (wage costs) effects. With respect to the 
determinants of working time, the estimates provide evidence that the work-sharing hypothesis 
does not hold. The decline in hours is mainly driven by increases in hourly wages (and hourly 
wage costs), and thus by productivity-sharing. 
Future work in the determination of hours and the interaction with wage determination is 
needed. If full-time hours are not solely determined by labour supply considerations, as 
suggested by the present analysis, alternative models are needed to investigate its determinants. 
From an empirical perspective, this may allow us to dispose of the rather unsatisfactory trend in 
the current empirical specification. Furthermore, it stresses that labour supply models should 
take hours restrictions into account. Another strand of research may be to explain the different 
levels of hours in a cross-country study. Blanchard (2004) identifies these differences as one of 
the important differences between the US and Europe. 
Another extension to the model would be to incorporate labour demand for workers or 
price setting in the analysis. This would strengthen the relation between the demand side and 
hours determination. Moreover, it would provide the opportunity to analyse in more detail the 
relation between working time and employment or unemployment. 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
I am grateful to Joan Muysken and Bertrand Candelon for useful comments on earlier versions 
of this paper.  
 
 
References 
Banerjee, A., L. Cockerell and B. Russel (2001), An I(2) analysis of inflation and markup, 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 16 (3), pp. 221-240. 
Bårdsen, G. (1989), Estimation of Long Run Coefficients in Error Correction Models, Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 51 (3), pp. 345-350. 
Bentivogli, C. (1992), Time allocation and economic welfare, Labour, vol. 6 (2), pp. 105-122. 
Blanchard, O. (2004), The Economic Future of Europe, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
forthcoming. 
Boswijk, H.P. (1994), Testing for an unstable root in conditional and structural error correction 
models, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 63 (1), pp. 37-60. 
Boswijk, H.P. and J.-P. Urbain (1997), Lagrange-multiplier tests for weak exogeneity: a 
synthesis, Econometric Reviews, vol. 16 (1), pp. 21-38. 
 17 
Broer, D.P., D.A.G. Draper and F.H. Huizinga (2000), The equilibrium rate of unemployment in 
the Netherlands, De Economist, vol. 148 (3), pp. 345-371. 
Broersma, L. and F.A.G. den Butter (2002), An explorative empirical analysis of the influence 
of labour flows on wage formation, Applied Economics, vol. 34 (13), pp. 1583-1592. 
Broersma, L., J. Koeman and C. Teulings (2000), Labour supply, the natural rate, and the 
welfare state in the Netherlands: the wrong institutions at the wrong point in yime, Oxford 
Economic Papers, vol. 52 (1), pp. 96-118. 
Calmfors, L. (1985), Work sharing, employment and wages, European Economic Review, vol. 
27 (3), pp. 293-309. 
De Neubourg, C. (1991), Where have all the hours gone? Working time reduction policies in the 
Netherlands, in: K. Hinrichs, W.K. Roche and C. Sirianni (eds.), Working time in 
transition: The political economy of working hours in industrial nations, Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, pp. 129-147. 
De Neubourg, C. and M. Vendrik (1994), An extended rationality model of social norms in 
labour supply, Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 15 (1), pp. 93-126. 
Dickens, W.T. and S.J. Lundberg (1993), Hours restrictions and labor supply, International 
Economic Review, vol. 34 (1), pp. 169-192. 
Doornik, J.A. and D.F. Hendry (1997), Modelling dynamic systems using PcFiml 9.0 for 
windows, London: International Thomson Business Press. 
Drèze, J. (1986), Work-sharing, Economic Policy, vol. 3, pp. 562-619. 
Dur, R.A.J. (2001), Explaining unemployment trends in the Netherlands, Journal of Policy 
Modeling, vol. 23 (2), pp. 161-168. 
Freeman, R.B. (1998), Work-Sharing to Full Employment: Serious Option or Populist Fallacy?, 
in: R.B. Freeman and P.Gottschalk (eds.), Generating Jobs, How to Increase Demand for 
Less-Skilled Workers, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, vol. 6, pp. 195-222. 
Graafland, J.J. and F.H. Huizinga (1999), Taxes and benefits in a non-linear wage equation, De 
Economist, vol. 147 (1), pp. 39-54. 
Hart, R.A. (1984), Worksharing and factor prices, European Economic Review, vol. 24 (2), pp. 
165-188. 
Hartog, J. (1999), Wither Dutch corporatism? Two decades of employment policies and welfare 
reforms, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 46 (4), pp. 458-487. 
Hunt, J. (1998), Hours reductions as work-sharing, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 
1998 (1), pp. 339-381. 
Hunt, J. (1999), Has work-sharing worked in Germany?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. 114 (1), pp. 117-148. 
Ilmakunnas, P. (1995), Working time and labour demand in Finnish manufacturing: short-run 
and long-run effects, Applied Economics, vol. 27 (10), pp. 995-1002. 
Jacobson, T. and H. Ohlsson (2000), Working time, employment, and work sharing: Evidence 
from Sweden, Empirical Economics, vol. 25 (1), pp. 169-187. 
Johansen, S. and K. Juselius (1990), Maximum likelihood estimation and inference on 
cointegration - With applications to the demand for money, Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics, vol. 52 (2), pp. 169-210. 
Johansen, S. and K. Juselius (1994), Identification of the long-run and the short-run structure; 
An application to the IS-LM model, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 63 (1), pp. 7-36. 
 18 
Kapteyn, A., A. Kalwij and A. Zaidi (2004), The myth of worksharing, Labour Economics, vol. 
11 (3), pp. 293-313. 
Layard, R., S. Nickell and R. Jackman (1991), Unemployment, macroeconomic performance 
and the labour market, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Marimon, R. and F. Zilibotti (2000), Employment and distributional effects of restricting 
working time, European Economic Review, vol. 44 (7), pp. 1291-1326. 
Muysken, J. A.P. van Veen and E.R. de Regt (1999), Does a shift in the tax burden create 
employment?, Applied Economics, vol. 31 (10), pp. 1195-1205. 
Osberg, L. and S. Phipps (1993), Labour supply with quantity constraints: estimates from a 
large sample of Canadian workers, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 45 (2), pp. 269-291. 
Spanos, A. (1990), The simultaneous-equations model revisited: statistical adequacy and 
identification, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 44 (1-2), pp. 88-105. 
Tummers, M. and I. Woittiez (1991), A simultaneous wage and labor supply model with hours 
restrictions, Journal of Human Resources, vol. 26 (3), pp. 393-423. 
Urbain, J.-P. (1995), Partial versus full systems modelling of cointegrated systems, An 
empirical illustration, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 69 (1), pp. 177-210. 
Van Doorne-Huiskes, A. and W. de Lange (1994), Netherlands, in: G. Bosch, P. Dawkins and 
F. Michon (eds.), Times are Changing, Geneva: ILO, pp. 229-245. 
 
 
Appendix 
The main source of the data is the so-called long macro series (1948-1995) of the Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis CPB, updated with the data available in their annual 
survey, Centraal Economisch Plan. These data are among others based on the National 
Accounts of Statistics Netherlands. When necessary, growth rates are used to deal with the 
breaks in the National Accounts series. The data are available on request. 
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Figure 1 Full-time working hours 
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Table 1  Key indicators 
 1960-1995 1960-1973 1974-1995 1974-1982 1983-1995 
 Growth rates 
H –0.8 –1.2 –0.6 –0.7 –0.5 
Wc 4.4 7.5 2.4 4.0 1.3 
Wn 2.7 5.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Ah 4.0 6.2 2.6 3.2 2.2 
 Levels 
u 4.4 1.1 6.5 4.0 8.2 
ϕN 73.9 69.3 76.8 81.3 73.6 
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Table 2  Granger causality tests (1962-1995) 
Exogenous variables Endogenous 
variable h ah u joint 
h  0.002** 
[0.008**] 
0.093 
[0.444] 
0.007** 
ah 0.610 
[0.456] 
 0.244 
[0.155] 
0.333 
u 0.771 
[0.718] 
0.104 
[0.072] 
 0.253 
p-values Granger causality test in tri-variate model, trend included; p-values 
bivariate Granger causality tests (trend included) between brackets. Significance 
levels: * at 5% and ** at 1%. 
 
 
 22 
 
Table 3  Unit root tests (1962-1995) 
ADFb Variable x Growth ratea 
x ∆ x 2∆ x 
h –0.007 (0.007) –0.21 [t, 0] –4.71** [c, 0]   
wc 0.041 (0.032) –1.39 [t, 3]  –0.86  [c, 2] –7.85** [n, 1] 
wn = wc − s 0.024 (0.029) –1.64 [t, 0] –3.42* [c, 0]   
ah 0.038 (0.024) –0.29 [t, 0] –3.00* [c, 0] –7.14** [n, 2] 
b 0.019 (0.041) –1.34 [t, 0] –3.49* [c, 0]   
u 0.002 (0.007) –0.86 [c, 2] –4.47** [n, 1]   
s 0.017 (0.025) –1.62 [c, 0] –3.00** [n, 0]   
ϕN = wc − ah 0.003 (0.023) –1.94 [c, 0] –4.86** [n, 0]   
ρ = b − wn − h 0.002 (0.027) –1.55 [c, 0] –5.15** [n, 0]   
ρ − ϕN –0.001 (0.028) –4.01** [c, 0]     
a Standard deviation between parentheses. 
b The characteristics of the (adjusted) Dickey-Fuller test statistic (ADF) are given between brackets 
[z,#]: z={n,c,t} indicates neither constant or trend, constant included or trend and constant included, 
respectively; # corresponds to the number of significant lags included. Significant rejection of non-
stationarity is indicated by asterisks (* at the 5%-level and ** at the 1%-level). 
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Table 4  Cointegration tests (1962-1995) 
H0 Trace maxλ  
r ≤ 5 5.255 5.255 
r ≤ 4 17.13 11.87 
r ≤ 3 38.06 20.93 
r ≤ 2 73.74** 35.68* 
r ≤ 1 119.8** 46.05** 
r = 0 189.8** 69.98** 
Likelihood ratio tests defined in Johansen and Juselius 
(1990). Significance levels: * at 5% and ** at 1%. Trend 
included. 
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Table 5  Diagnostic tests unrestricted reduced form (1962-1995) 
 Dependent variable (OLS) 
 
cw∆  h∆  ( )cw h∆ +  
 Test statisticsa 
σˆ  (x100) 1.000 0.370 0.921 
RSS (x1000) 1.599 0.220 1.188 
PF’97 F(2,16) = 1.68 F(2,16) = 0.42 F(2,16) = 1.86 
LMA F(1,15) = 10.77 ** F(1,15) = 0.29 F(1,15) = 3.90 
ARCH F(1,14) = 0.12 F(1,14) = 0.31 F(1,14) = 0.19 
NORM 2χ (2) = 0.58 2χ (2) = 2.02 2χ (2) = 0.82 
RESET F(1,15) = 0.14 F(1,15) = 3.24 F(1,15) = 1.68 
WNC 21.85 61.41** 21.67 
CDF –4.39 ** –4.05** –3.86** 
 Model test statisticsb 
log-likelihood 375.343 375.343  
ρˆ  –0.389 –0.020  
PF’97 F(4,16) = 1.32 F(4,16) = 1.32  
VLMA F(4,26) = 2.08 F(4,26) = 2.08  
VNORM 2χ (4) = 1.89 2χ (4) = 2.84  
LMC F(8,38) = 1.85 F(8,38) = 1.85  
a σˆ is the equation standard error; RSS is the residual sum of squares; PF’97 is a 
Chow test for parameter constancy up to 1997; LMA is a Lagrange-Multiplier test 
for first-order residual autocorrelation; ARCH is a Lagrange-Multiplier test for 
first-order autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity; NORM is WinGive’s 
normality test of the residuals; RESET is Ramsey’s specification test; WNC is a 
Wald statistic for no-cointegration; CDF is a Dickey-Fuller test with constant but 
no trend for non-stationarity of the cointegrating vector. Significance levels test 
statistics: * at 5% and ** at 1%. 
b ρˆ  is the correlation between the residuals; VLMA is a test for first-order residual 
vector autocorrelation; VNORM is WinGive’s vector normality test of the 
residuals; LMC is a LM-test for weak exogeneity of the regressors for the long-run 
parameters. 
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Table 6  Cointegration tests just-identified model  
                          (FIML, 1962-1995) 
 Dependent variable 
 ( )cw h∆ +  h∆  
 Cointegrating vectorsa 
wc 1. 0.610 
(0.588) 
h 0.393 
(0.676) 
1. 
ah –0.824 
(0.342) 
0.119 
(0.507) 
b –0.232 
(0.189) 
–0.546 
(0.232) 
u 1.182 
(0.619) 
–0.506 
(0.698) 
s –0.588 
(0.117) 
–0.120 
(0.344) 
trend (*100) 0.576 
(0.602) 
–0.941 
(0.536) 
 Error correction coefficientsa 
 –1.158 (0.380) 
–0.456 
(0.159) 
 No-cointegration testsb 
WNC 21.10 51.21** 
CDF –4.12** –3.30* 
 Model test statisticsc 
σˆ (x100) 0.933 0.367 
ρˆ   0.580  
log-likelihood  375.343  
a Standard errors between parentheses. 
b WNC is a Wald statistic for no-cointegration; CDF is a Dickey-
Fuller test with constant but no trend for non-stationarity of the 
cointegrating vector. Significance levels test statistics: * at 5% 
and ** at 1%. 
c σˆ is the equation standard error and ρˆ  is the correlation 
between the residuals. 
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Table 7  Parsimonious estimation results (FIML, 1962-1995) 
Dependent variable   
 
cw∆  h∆      
Short-run dynamicsa  Cointegrating vectors a 
Constant –1.234 
(0.627) 
1.069 
(0.533)  
 zw zh 
ctw∆   –0.133 
(0.035)  
wc 1. 0.962 
(0.160) 
th∆  –1. 
(–) 
 
 
h 0.159 
(0.125) 
1. 
1th −∆   –0.294 
(0.110)  
ah –0.641 
(0.031) 
 
ta∆  0.480 
(–) 
 
 
b –0.359 
(–) 
–0.712 
(0.139) 
tb∆  0.268 
(–) 
0.120 
(0.024)  
u 1.024 
(0.186) 
0. 
(–) 
1tb −∆   0.120 
(–)  
s –0.609 
(0.040) 
–0.437 
(0.091) 
ts∆  0.455 
(–) 
0.133 
(–)  
trend (*100) 
 
–1.201 
(0.294) 
Error correction coefficientsa     
zwt-1 –0.748 
(0.080) 
0.280 
(0.075)  
 
  
zht-1  –0.485 
(0.119)  
 
  
Model test statisticsb  No-cointegration testsc 
σˆ (x100) 0.875 0.323  WNC 52.17** 64.62** 
ρˆ   0.166   CDF –3.71** –3.37* 
LMO 2χ (8) = 11.8     
log-likelihood  363.291      
p-value URF  0.238      
a Standard errors between parentheses. 
b σˆ is the equation standard error; ρˆ is the correlation between the residuals; LMO is a LM-
test for orthogonality of the regressors; the p-value URF is based on a χ2-test against the 
unrestricted model. 
c WNC is a Wald statistic for no-cointegration and CDF is a Dickey-Fuller test with constant 
but no trend for non-stationarity of the cointegrating vector. Significance levels test statistics: 
* at 5% and ** at 1%. 
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Table 8  Long run reduced form elasticities 
 ah b u s trend (*100) 
wc   0.76 0.29 –1.21   0.64 –0.23 
h –0.73 0.43   1.16 –0.18   1.42 
wc+h   0.03 0.73 –0.05   0.46   1.19 
 
 
